/* $NetBSD: xform_esp.c,v 1.98.2.1 2020/10/08 17:49:03 martin Exp $ */ /* $FreeBSD: xform_esp.c,v 1.2.2.1 2003/01/24 05:11:36 sam Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: ip_esp.c,v 1.69 2001/06/26 06:18:59 angelos Exp $ */ /* * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de). * * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995. * * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, * by Angelos D. Keromytis. * * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis * and Niels Provos. * * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis. * * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis. * * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software. * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to * all. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR * PURPOSE. */ #include __KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: xform_esp.c,v 1.98.2.1 2020/10/08 17:49:03 martin Exp $"); #if defined(_KERNEL_OPT) #include "opt_inet.h" #include "opt_ipsec.h" #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef INET6 #include #include #endif #include #include #include percpu_t *espstat_percpu; int esp_enable = 1; static int esp_max_ivlen; /* max iv length over all algorithms */ static int esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *op); static int esp_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp); const uint8_t esp_stats[256] = { SADB_EALG_STATS_INIT }; static pool_cache_t esp_tdb_crypto_pool_cache; static size_t esp_pool_item_size; /* * NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support. * NB: if you add support here; be sure to add code to esp_attach below! */ const struct enc_xform * esp_algorithm_lookup(int alg) { switch (alg) { case SADB_EALG_DESCBC: return &enc_xform_des; case SADB_EALG_3DESCBC: return &enc_xform_3des; case SADB_X_EALG_AES: return &enc_xform_rijndael128; case SADB_X_EALG_BLOWFISHCBC: return &enc_xform_blf; case SADB_X_EALG_CAST128CBC: return &enc_xform_cast5; case SADB_X_EALG_SKIPJACK: return &enc_xform_skipjack; case SADB_X_EALG_CAMELLIACBC: return &enc_xform_camellia; case SADB_X_EALG_AESCTR: return &enc_xform_aes_ctr; case SADB_X_EALG_AESGCM16: return &enc_xform_aes_gcm; case SADB_X_EALG_AESGMAC: return &enc_xform_aes_gmac; case SADB_EALG_NULL: return &enc_xform_null; } return NULL; } size_t esp_hdrsiz(const struct secasvar *sav) { size_t size; if (sav != NULL) { /*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/ KASSERT(sav->tdb_encalgxform != NULL); /* * base header size * + iv length for CBC mode * + max pad length * + sizeof(esp trailer) * + icv length (if any). */ if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) size = sizeof(struct esp); else size = sizeof(struct newesp); size += sav->tdb_encalgxform->ivsize + 9 + sizeof(struct esptail); /*XXX need alg check???*/ if (sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL && sav->replay) size += ah_authsiz(sav); } else { /* * base header size * + max iv length for CBC mode * + max pad length * + sizeof(esp trailer) * + max icv supported. */ size = sizeof(struct newesp) + esp_max_ivlen + 9 + sizeof(struct esptail) + ah_authsiz(NULL); } return size; } /* * esp_init() is called when an SPI is being set up. */ static int esp_init(struct secasvar *sav, const struct xformsw *xsp) { const struct enc_xform *txform; struct cryptoini cria, crie, *cr; int keylen; int error; txform = esp_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc); if (txform == NULL) { DPRINTF("unsupported encryption algorithm %d\n", sav->alg_enc); return EINVAL; } if (sav->key_enc == NULL) { DPRINTF("no encoding key for %s algorithm\n", txform->name); return EINVAL; } if ((sav->flags&(SADB_X_EXT_OLD|SADB_X_EXT_IV4B)) == SADB_X_EXT_IV4B) { DPRINTF("4-byte IV not supported with protocol\n"); return EINVAL; } keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc); if (txform->minkey > keylen || keylen > txform->maxkey) { DPRINTF("invalid key length %u, must be in " "the range [%u..%u] for algorithm %s\n", keylen, txform->minkey, txform->maxkey, txform->name); return EINVAL; } sav->ivlen = txform->ivsize; /* * Setup AH-related state. */ if (sav->alg_auth != 0) { error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria); if (error) return error; } /* NB: override anything set in ah_init0 */ sav->tdb_xform = xsp; sav->tdb_encalgxform = txform; switch (sav->alg_enc) { case SADB_X_EALG_AESGCM16: case SADB_X_EALG_AESGMAC: switch (keylen) { case 20: sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_AES128GMAC; sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_gmac_aes_128; break; case 28: sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_AES192GMAC; sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_gmac_aes_192; break; case 36: sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_AES256GMAC; sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_gmac_aes_256; break; default: DPRINTF("invalid key length %u, must be either of " "20, 28 or 36\n", keylen); return EINVAL; } memset(&cria, 0, sizeof(cria)); cria.cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type; cria.cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc); cria.cri_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc); break; default: break; } /* Initialize crypto session. */ memset(&crie, 0, sizeof(crie)); crie.cri_alg = sav->tdb_encalgxform->type; crie.cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc); crie.cri_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc); /* XXX Rounds ? */ if (sav->tdb_authalgxform && sav->tdb_encalgxform) { /* init both auth & enc */ crie.cri_next = &cria; cr = &crie; } else if (sav->tdb_encalgxform) { cr = &crie; } else if (sav->tdb_authalgxform) { cr = &cria; } else { /* XXX cannot happen? */ DPRINTF("no encoding OR authentication xform!\n"); return EINVAL; } return crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, cr, crypto_support); } /* * Paranoia. */ static int esp_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav) { /* NB: ah_zerorize free's the crypto session state */ int error = ah_zeroize(sav); if (sav->key_enc) { explicit_memset(_KEYBUF(sav->key_enc), 0, _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc)); } sav->tdb_encalgxform = NULL; sav->tdb_xform = NULL; return error; } /* * ESP input processing, called (eventually) through the protocol switch. */ static int esp_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff) { const struct auth_hash *esph; const struct enc_xform *espx; struct tdb_crypto *tc; int plen, alen, hlen, error, stat = ESP_STAT_CRYPTO; struct newesp *esp; struct cryptodesc *crde; struct cryptop *crp; KASSERT(sav != NULL); KASSERT(sav->tdb_encalgxform != NULL); KASSERTMSG((skip & 3) == 0 && (m->m_pkthdr.len & 3) == 0, "misaligned packet, skip %u pkt len %u", skip, m->m_pkthdr.len); /* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */ M_REGION_GET(esp, struct newesp *, m, skip, sizeof(struct newesp)); if (esp == NULL) { /* m already freed */ return ENOBUFS; } esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform; espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform; KASSERT(espx != NULL); /* Determine the ESP header length */ if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) hlen = sizeof(struct esp) + sav->ivlen; else hlen = sizeof(struct newesp) + sav->ivlen; /* Authenticator hash size */ alen = esph ? esph->authsize : 0; /* * Verify payload length is multiple of encryption algorithm block * size. * * The payload must also be 4-byte-aligned. This is implicitly * verified here too, since the blocksize is always 4-byte-aligned. */ plen = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen); KASSERT((espx->blocksize & 3) == 0); if ((plen & (espx->blocksize - 1)) || (plen <= 0)) { char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN]; DPRINTF("payload of %d octets not a multiple of %d octets," " SA %s/%08lx\n", plen, espx->blocksize, ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)); stat = ESP_STAT_BADILEN; error = EINVAL; goto out; } /* * Check sequence number. */ if (esph && sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(esp->esp_seq), sav)) { char logbuf[IPSEC_LOGSASTRLEN]; DPRINTF("packet replay check for %s\n", ipsec_logsastr(sav, logbuf, sizeof(logbuf))); stat = ESP_STAT_REPLAY; error = EACCES; goto out; } /* Update the counters */ ESP_STATADD(ESP_STAT_IBYTES, plen); /* Get crypto descriptors */ crp = crypto_getreq(esph ? 2 : 1); if (crp == NULL) { DPRINTF("failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n"); error = ENOBUFS; goto out; } /* Get IPsec-specific opaque pointer */ size_t extra __diagused = esph == NULL ? 0 : alen; KASSERTMSG(sizeof(*tc) + extra <= esp_pool_item_size, "sizeof(*tc) + extra=%zu > esp_pool_item_size=%zu\n", sizeof(*tc) + extra, esp_pool_item_size); tc = pool_cache_get(esp_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, PR_NOWAIT); if (tc == NULL) { DPRINTF("failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n"); error = ENOBUFS; goto out1; } error = m_makewritable(&m, 0, m->m_pkthdr.len, M_NOWAIT); if (error) { DPRINTF("m_makewritable failed\n"); goto out2; } if (esph) { struct cryptodesc *crda; KASSERT(crp->crp_desc != NULL); crda = crp->crp_desc; /* Authentication descriptor */ crda->crd_skip = skip; if (espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_GCM_16) crda->crd_len = hlen - sav->ivlen; else crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + alen); crda->crd_inject = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen; crda->crd_alg = esph->type; if (espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_GCM_16 || espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_GMAC) { crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc); crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc); } else { crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); } /* Copy the authenticator */ m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, (tc + 1)); /* Chain authentication request */ crde = crda->crd_next; } else { crde = crp->crp_desc; } { int s = pserialize_read_enter(); /* * Take another reference to the SA for opencrypto callback. */ if (__predict_false(sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_DEAD)) { pserialize_read_exit(s); stat = ESP_STAT_NOTDB; error = ENOENT; goto out2; } KEY_SA_REF(sav); pserialize_read_exit(s); } /* Crypto operation descriptor */ crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length */ crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; crp->crp_buf = m; crp->crp_callback = esp_input_cb; crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; crp->crp_opaque = tc; /* These are passed as-is to the callback */ tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; tc->tc_protoff = protoff; tc->tc_skip = skip; tc->tc_sav = sav; /* Decryption descriptor */ KASSERTMSG(crde != NULL, "null esp crypto descriptor"); crde->crd_skip = skip + hlen; if (espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_GMAC) crde->crd_len = 0; else crde->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen); crde->crd_inject = skip + hlen - sav->ivlen; crde->crd_alg = espx->type; crde->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc); crde->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc); /* XXX Rounds ? */ return crypto_dispatch(crp); out2: pool_cache_put(esp_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc); out1: crypto_freereq(crp); out: ESP_STATINC(stat); m_freem(m); return error; } #ifdef INET6 #define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff) do { \ if (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { \ error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff); \ } else { \ error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff); \ } \ } while (0) #else #define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff) \ (error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff)) #endif /* * ESP input callback from the crypto driver. */ static int esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) { char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN]; uint8_t lastthree[3], aalg[AH_ALEN_MAX]; int hlen, skip, protoff, error; struct mbuf *m; const struct auth_hash *esph; struct tdb_crypto *tc; struct secasvar *sav; struct secasindex *saidx; void *ptr; IPSEC_DECLARE_LOCK_VARIABLE; KASSERT(crp->crp_desc != NULL); KASSERT(crp->crp_opaque != NULL); tc = crp->crp_opaque; skip = tc->tc_skip; protoff = tc->tc_protoff; m = crp->crp_buf; IPSEC_ACQUIRE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); sav = tc->tc_sav; saidx = &sav->sah->saidx; KASSERTMSG(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET || saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6, "unexpected protocol family %u", saidx->dst.sa.sa_family); esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform; /* Check for crypto errors */ if (crp->crp_etype) { /* Reset the session ID */ if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { KEY_SA_UNREF(&sav); IPSEC_RELEASE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); return crypto_dispatch(crp); } ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_NOXFORM); DPRINTF("crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype); error = crp->crp_etype; goto bad; } ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_HIST + esp_stats[sav->alg_enc]); /* If authentication was performed, check now. */ if (esph != NULL) { /* * If we have a tag, it means an IPsec-aware NIC did * the verification for us. Otherwise we need to * check the authentication calculation. */ AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + ah_stats[sav->alg_auth]); /* Copy the authenticator from the packet */ m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - esph->authsize, esph->authsize, aalg); ptr = (tc + 1); /* Verify authenticator */ if (!consttime_memequal(ptr, aalg, esph->authsize)) { DPRINTF("authentication hash mismatch " "for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)); ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_BADAUTH); error = EACCES; goto bad; } /* Remove trailing authenticator */ m_adj(m, -(esph->authsize)); } /* Release the crypto descriptors */ pool_cache_put(esp_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc); tc = NULL; crypto_freereq(crp); crp = NULL; /* * Packet is now decrypted. */ m->m_flags |= M_DECRYPTED; /* * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate. */ if (sav->replay) { uint32_t seq; m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newesp, esp_seq), sizeof(seq), &seq); if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) { char logbuf[IPSEC_LOGSASTRLEN]; DPRINTF("packet replay check for %s\n", ipsec_logsastr(sav, logbuf, sizeof(logbuf))); ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_REPLAY); error = EACCES; goto bad; } } /* Determine the ESP header length */ if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) hlen = sizeof(struct esp) + sav->ivlen; else hlen = sizeof(struct newesp) + sav->ivlen; /* Remove the ESP header and IV from the mbuf. */ error = m_striphdr(m, skip, hlen); if (error) { ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_HDROPS); DPRINTF("bad mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)); goto bad; } /* Save the last three bytes of decrypted data */ m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - 3, 3, lastthree); /* Verify pad length */ if (lastthree[1] + 2 > m->m_pkthdr.len - skip) { ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_BADILEN); DPRINTF("invalid padding length %d " "for %u byte packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", lastthree[1], m->m_pkthdr.len - skip, ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)); error = EINVAL; goto bad; } /* Verify correct decryption by checking the last padding bytes */ if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_PMASK) != SADB_X_EXT_PRAND) { if (lastthree[1] != lastthree[0] && lastthree[1] != 0) { ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_BADENC); DPRINTF("decryption failed for packet in SA " "%s/%08lx\n", ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)); DPRINTF("%x %x\n", lastthree[0], lastthree[1]); error = EINVAL; goto bad; } } /* Trim the mbuf chain to remove trailing authenticator and padding */ m_adj(m, -(lastthree[1] + 2)); /* Restore the Next Protocol field */ m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(uint8_t), lastthree + 2); IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff); KEY_SA_UNREF(&sav); IPSEC_RELEASE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); return error; bad: if (sav) KEY_SA_UNREF(&sav); IPSEC_RELEASE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); if (m != NULL) m_freem(m); if (tc != NULL) pool_cache_put(esp_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc); if (crp != NULL) crypto_freereq(crp); return error; } /* * ESP output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet(). */ static int esp_output(struct mbuf *m, const struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff) { char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN]; const struct enc_xform *espx; const struct auth_hash *esph; int hlen, rlen, tlen, padlen, blks, alen, i, roff; struct mbuf *mo = NULL; struct tdb_crypto *tc; struct secasindex *saidx; unsigned char *tail; uint8_t prot; int error, maxpacketsize; struct esptail *esptail; struct cryptodesc *crde, *crda; struct cryptop *crp; esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform; espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform; KASSERT(espx != NULL); /* Determine the ESP header length */ if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) hlen = sizeof(struct esp) + sav->ivlen; else hlen = sizeof(struct newesp) + sav->ivlen; /* Authenticator hash size */ alen = esph ? esph->authsize : 0; /* * NB: The null encoding transform has a blocksize of 4 * so that headers are properly aligned. */ blks = espx->blocksize; /* IV blocksize */ /* Raw payload length. */ rlen = m->m_pkthdr.len - skip; /* Encryption padding. */ padlen = ((blks - ((rlen + sizeof(struct esptail)) % blks)) % blks); /* Length of what we append (tail). */ tlen = padlen + sizeof(struct esptail) + alen; ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_OUTPUT); saidx = &sav->sah->saidx; /* Check for maximum packet size violations. */ switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) { #ifdef INET case AF_INET: maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET; break; #endif #ifdef INET6 case AF_INET6: maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET; break; #endif default: DPRINTF("unknown/unsupported protocol family %d, " "SA %s/%08lx\n", saidx->dst.sa.sa_family, ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), (u_long)ntohl(sav->spi)); ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_NOPF); error = EPFNOSUPPORT; goto bad; } if (skip + hlen + rlen + tlen > maxpacketsize) { DPRINTF("packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big (len %u, " "max len %u)\n", ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), skip + hlen + rlen + tlen, maxpacketsize); ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_TOOBIG); error = EMSGSIZE; goto bad; } /* Update the counters. */ ESP_STATADD(ESP_STAT_OBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip); m = m_clone(m); if (m == NULL) { DPRINTF("cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)); ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_HDROPS); error = ENOBUFS; goto bad; } /* Inject ESP header. */ mo = m_makespace(m, skip, hlen, &roff); if (mo == NULL) { DPRINTF("failed to inject %u byte ESP hdr for SA " "%s/%08lx\n", hlen, ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)); ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_HDROPS); error = ENOBUFS; goto bad; } /* Initialize ESP header. */ memcpy(mtod(mo, char *) + roff, &sav->spi, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (sav->replay) { uint32_t replay; #ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG /* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */ if (ipsec_replay) replay = htonl(sav->replay->count); else #endif replay = htonl(atomic_inc_32_nv(&sav->replay->count)); memcpy(mtod(mo,char *) + roff + sizeof(uint32_t), &replay, sizeof(uint32_t)); } /* * Grow the mbuf, we will append data at the tail. */ tail = m_pad(m, tlen); if (tail == NULL) { DPRINTF("m_pad failed for SA %s/%08lx\n", ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)); m = NULL; error = ENOBUFS; goto bad; } /* * Add padding: random, zero, or self-describing. */ switch (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_PMASK) { case SADB_X_EXT_PSEQ: for (i = 0; i < padlen; i++) tail[i] = i + 1; break; case SADB_X_EXT_PRAND: (void)cprng_fast(tail, padlen); break; case SADB_X_EXT_PZERO: default: memset(tail, 0, padlen); break; } /* Build the ESP Trailer. */ esptail = (struct esptail *)&tail[padlen]; esptail->esp_padlen = padlen; m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(uint8_t), &esptail->esp_nxt); /* Fix Next Protocol in IPv4/IPv6 header. */ prot = IPPROTO_ESP; m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(uint8_t), &prot); /* Get crypto descriptors. */ crp = crypto_getreq(esph ? 2 : 1); if (crp == NULL) { DPRINTF("failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n"); ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_CRYPTO); error = ENOBUFS; goto bad; } /* Get the descriptors. */ crde = crp->crp_desc; crda = crde->crd_next; /* Encryption descriptor. */ crde->crd_skip = skip + hlen; if (espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_GMAC) crde->crd_len = 0; else crde->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen); crde->crd_flags = CRD_F_ENCRYPT; crde->crd_inject = skip + hlen - sav->ivlen; crde->crd_alg = espx->type; crde->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc); crde->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc); /* XXX Rounds ? */ /* IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ tc = pool_cache_get(esp_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, PR_NOWAIT); if (tc == NULL) { crypto_freereq(crp); DPRINTF("failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n"); ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_CRYPTO); error = ENOBUFS; goto bad; } { int s = pserialize_read_enter(); /* * Take another reference to the SP and the SA for opencrypto callback. */ if (__predict_false(isr->sp->state == IPSEC_SPSTATE_DEAD || sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_DEAD)) { pserialize_read_exit(s); pool_cache_put(esp_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc); crypto_freereq(crp); ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_NOTDB); error = ENOENT; goto bad; } KEY_SP_REF(isr->sp); KEY_SA_REF(sav); pserialize_read_exit(s); } /* Callback parameters */ tc->tc_isr = isr; tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; tc->tc_dst = saidx->dst; tc->tc_proto = saidx->proto; tc->tc_sav = sav; /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; crp->crp_buf = m; crp->crp_callback = esp_output_cb; crp->crp_opaque = tc; crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; if (esph) { /* Authentication descriptor. */ crda->crd_skip = skip; if (espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_GCM_16) crda->crd_len = hlen - sav->ivlen; else crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + alen); crda->crd_inject = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen; /* Authentication operation. */ crda->crd_alg = esph->type; if (espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_GCM_16 || espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_GMAC) { crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc); crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc); } else { crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); } } return crypto_dispatch(crp); bad: if (m) m_freem(m); return error; } /* * ESP output callback from the crypto driver. */ static int esp_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp) { struct tdb_crypto *tc; const struct ipsecrequest *isr; struct secasvar *sav; struct mbuf *m; int err, error; IPSEC_DECLARE_LOCK_VARIABLE; KASSERT(crp->crp_opaque != NULL); tc = crp->crp_opaque; m = crp->crp_buf; IPSEC_ACQUIRE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); isr = tc->tc_isr; sav = tc->tc_sav; /* Check for crypto errors. */ if (crp->crp_etype) { /* Reset session ID. */ if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { IPSEC_RELEASE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); return crypto_dispatch(crp); } ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_NOXFORM); DPRINTF("crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype); error = crp->crp_etype; goto bad; } ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_HIST + esp_stats[sav->alg_enc]); if (sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL) AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + ah_stats[sav->alg_auth]); /* Release crypto descriptors. */ pool_cache_put(esp_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc); crypto_freereq(crp); #ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG /* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */ if (ipsec_integrity) { static unsigned char ipseczeroes[AH_ALEN_MAX]; const struct auth_hash *esph; /* * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of * the other side. */ esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform; if (esph != NULL) { m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - esph->authsize, esph->authsize, ipseczeroes); } } #endif /* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */ err = ipsec_process_done(m, isr, sav); KEY_SA_UNREF(&sav); KEY_SP_UNREF(&isr->sp); IPSEC_RELEASE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); return err; bad: if (sav) KEY_SA_UNREF(&sav); KEY_SP_UNREF(&isr->sp); IPSEC_RELEASE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); if (m) m_freem(m); pool_cache_put(esp_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc); crypto_freereq(crp); return error; } static struct xformsw esp_xformsw = { .xf_type = XF_ESP, .xf_flags = XFT_CONF|XFT_AUTH, .xf_name = "IPsec ESP", .xf_init = esp_init, .xf_zeroize = esp_zeroize, .xf_input = esp_input, .xf_output = esp_output, .xf_next = NULL, }; void esp_attach(void) { espstat_percpu = percpu_alloc(sizeof(uint64_t) * ESP_NSTATS); extern int ah_max_authsize; KASSERT(ah_max_authsize != 0); esp_pool_item_size = sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + ah_max_authsize; esp_tdb_crypto_pool_cache = pool_cache_init(esp_pool_item_size, coherency_unit, 0, 0, "esp_tdb_crypto", NULL, IPL_SOFTNET, NULL, NULL, NULL); #define MAXIV(xform) \ if (xform.ivsize > esp_max_ivlen) \ esp_max_ivlen = xform.ivsize \ esp_max_ivlen = 0; MAXIV(enc_xform_des); /* SADB_EALG_DESCBC */ MAXIV(enc_xform_3des); /* SADB_EALG_3DESCBC */ MAXIV(enc_xform_rijndael128); /* SADB_X_EALG_AES */ MAXIV(enc_xform_blf); /* SADB_X_EALG_BLOWFISHCBC */ MAXIV(enc_xform_cast5); /* SADB_X_EALG_CAST128CBC */ MAXIV(enc_xform_skipjack); /* SADB_X_EALG_SKIPJACK */ MAXIV(enc_xform_camellia); /* SADB_X_EALG_CAMELLIACBC */ MAXIV(enc_xform_aes_ctr); /* SADB_X_EALG_AESCTR */ MAXIV(enc_xform_null); /* SADB_EALG_NULL */ xform_register(&esp_xformsw); #undef MAXIV }